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The Kuznets inequality-development hypothesis can be tested with time-series data rather
than the cross-section analyses found in earlier literature. Single-country time-series analysis
cannot be done without addressing endogeneity between output and inequality. South Africa has
been under-researched in this area due to a lack of data. Recent data released by the Presidency
of South Africa makes such analysis possible. Besides, the use of a single inequality index in
such a multiracial society is likely to capture only average eﬀects. This paper jointly estimates
production, inequality (decomposed by sub-group) and poverty with 3sls using South African
data. The ﬁndings suggest that production is aﬀected negatively by between-group inequality.
Credit constraints and interracial tensions are possible causes, generating signiﬁcant adverse
eﬀects that stiﬂe economic productivity. Within-group inequality enhances production, possibly
due to within-group social capital. There is evidence of an inverted U-shape relationship between
per capita income and between-group inequality, but a U-shaped one between per capita income
and within-group inequality. However due to the eﬀects of the active post-apartheid policies
— which reduce between-group inequality, but increase within-group inequality — it is doubtful
if this relationship is capturing a Kuznets process. There is a signiﬁcant poverty-increasing
(reducing) eﬀect of total and between-group inequalities (output). The abjectly poor seem to
suﬀer more from inequality than others do. Policy eﬀorts have to focus on reducing between-
group inequality.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The debate over the conditions necessary for economic growth to improve the lives of the poor has
resulted in some consensus. The ﬁrst is that the poor share in aggregate income growth as well
as suﬀer the eﬀects of economic slowdowns (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However, there are diﬀerent
viewpoints over the exact conceptualisation and measurement of the extent to which growth beneﬁts
the poor. The absolute and relative concepts have been the most prominent in the policy arena.
The absolute concept constitutes the strong absolute — which requires that the absolute income gain
of the poor be more than that of the average, or of the rich (Klasen, 2005) — and the weak absolute
— according to which growth is pro-poor if the suitably aggregated growth rate of the poor is greater
than zero (White and Anderson, 2000). With the relative concept, growth has to be relatively biased
towards the poor, leading to faster poverty reduction (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000).
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1The second consensus is that poverty reduction is fastest in situations where income growth is
accompanied by falling inequality (Bourguignon, 2004; Son and Kakwani, 2006).
However, a key challenge in development policies is the nature of the relationship between growth
and inequality (Bourguignon, 2004). Besides, empirical works that look at the inﬂuence of inequality
on growth use only a single inequality statistic (generally the Gini coeﬃcient). Voitchovsky (2005)
suggests that such a measure of inequality could be misleading since it might only reﬂect an average of
the shape of the income distribution curve. There are other reasons why the inequality-development
relationship should be revisited for South Africa. First, South Africa has been under-researched due
to lack of data. Recent data released by the Presidency of South Africa makes such analysis possible.
Secondly, in a multiracial society like South Africa, inequality within groups and between groups is
likely to aﬀect (or respond to) growth in diﬀerent ways and an average inequality measure may not
be able to reveal the details. Thirdly, the Kuznets (1955) inequality-development hypothesis can be
tested with time-series1 data rather than the cross-section analyses found in earlier literature.
In this paper, the inequality, growth and poverty relationship is tackled in simultaneous-equations
frameworks. A simple output per worker Cobb-Douglas production framework is adopted, while an
inequality equation is speciﬁed by augmenting Ahluwalia’s (1976a) formulation with government
expenses (per unit of GDP). The framework underlying the poverty functional form is the poverty
equivalent growth model due to Son and Kakwani (2006). The equations are estimated jointly in
order to control for possible production-inequality endogeneity. The rest of the paper is structured
as follows: Section two examines the theories related to the growth, inequality and poverty nexus;
in section three, the model is developed and estimation techniques and data issues explored. Section
four presents the results while section ﬁve concludes with some recommendations.
2 Growth, Inequality and poverty in literature
2.1 Pro-poor Framework
Son and Kakwani (2006) show that for societal mean income (μ), and percentage share of the income
of the bottom px100 of the population L(p), the growth rate of the mean income of the bottom p
percent of the population is
g(p)=∆ln(μL(p)) (1)
such that if g(p) > 0( <0), for all p, then poverty has decreased (increased) unambiguously
between two periods. They suggest a pro-poor growth rate (γ∗) to be the area under the poverty







∆ln(μL(p))dp or γ∗ = γ − ∆In (G∗) (2)
where γ is the growth rate of societal mean income and ∆ln (G∗) i st h er a t eo fc h a n g eo f
inequality. If inequality decreases (increases) in a given period, then the pro-poor growth rate is
greater (less) than the actual growth rate for that period.
However, the link between growth and inequality is a crucial issue in the pro-poor debate. In
literature, this relationship can be very complex and multidimensional. There has been increasing
interest in the investigation of the growth-inequality nexus in recent literature. On the one hand
there are those who pursue Kuznets’s (1955) inverted U-shape hypothesis, which seeks to deepen
understanding on the distributional consequences of growth. On the other hand there are those who
look at the growth impact of inequality.
1The Kuznets hypothesis is originally based on time-series data for England, Germany and United States, but
later literature is dominated by cross-section analyses.
22.2 Inequality impact of Growth
The ﬁrst inﬂuential argument for the impact of growth on inequality is the work of Kuznets (1955).
He hypothesises that at the early stages of growth in developing countries, inequality increases, and
then starts to fall. Since then, this hypothesis has gained interest among researchers (Oshima, 1970;
Ahluwalia, 1976a). Basic mechanisms have been proposed to explain this hypothesis, such as labour
market imperfections, productivity diﬀerentials across economic sectors and the changing importance
of the various sectors in the economy (Kuznets, 1955), but also individual accumulation behaviour
and changing factor rewards (Stiglitz, 1969); changing institutions, social relations, culture etc.2
(Justman and Gradstein, 1999). North (1990) has highlighted the possibility of transaction costs —
which hinder institutional change — falling with economic growth.
Empirical works that lend support to this hypothesis make use of cross-country datasets from
the1950s to 1970s, and regress a measure of inequality against a suitable function of mean income.
Some of the most inﬂuential examples are Adelman and Morris (1973), Ahluwalia (1976a and 1976b)
and Ram (1995). Ahluwalia (1976a) estimates inequality as a function of log of per capita income
and its square to capture the quadratic eﬀect in cross-section data, and conﬁrms the existence of
an inverted U-shaped relationship. Anand and Kanbur (1993a and 1993b) propose various other
functional forms and show that Ahluwalia’s (1976a) estimates are not robust to functional-form
variations. Bruno et al. (1999) argue that there may be important country-speciﬁc factors (including
past inequality) determining current inequality, which may also be correlated with current income
levels, leading to biased estimates. This relationship was veriﬁed for the 1970s, but as more and
better data became available, it was not veriﬁed for later periods. Bruno et al. (1999) replicated
the speciﬁcations and found no evidence of an inverted U-shape relation in latter cross-sections.
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) use unbalanced panel data for developing countries and ﬁnd that
this hypothesis is not veriﬁed. Deininger and Squire (1996a) use unbalanced panel data with about
ten-year intervals3. A pool regression of Gini coeﬃcients with respect to per capita income and its
inverse gives a signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped relationship. However, decadal diﬀerencing to account
only for time changes gives an insigniﬁcant curvature. The introduction of country ﬁxed eﬀects4
eliminates the U-shape.
As Bourguignon (2004) remarks, all the above discussions do not imply that growth has no
signiﬁcant impact on inequality, but rather point to the presence of several country-speciﬁcf a c t o r s
in the inequality impact of growth. Besides, the Kuznets inequality-development hypothesis can
be tested with time-series data rather than the cross-section analyses found in earlier literature.
This calls for more country-speciﬁc case studies (using time-series data). Bourguignon, Ferreira and
Lustig (2003) suggest that growth indeed impacts inequality, a major contributing factor being the
diﬃculty of the poorest households in incorporating themselves into the labour market in the advent
of slow growth.
2.3 Growth impact of Inequality
Another concern that has received attention since the early 1990s is whether inequality aﬀects
growth. The works of Galor and Zeira (1993), Persson and Tabelini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) are pioneers. Two main channels have been highlighted in the literature — credit constraints
and political economic factors — both of which have implications for human and physical capital
accumulation.
The evolution of inequality and output is inﬂuenced by the poor’s limited choice of occupation,
and constrained investment opportunities due to credit rationing. When the poor are thus prevented
2This is by means of non-homothetic preferences such that the demand for social services changes with income
growth. People subsequently become politically more active, leading to change in the distribution of political power
and evolution of institutions.
3This is considered problematic with possible measurement errors (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
4Country ﬁxed eﬀects ensure a parallel path for diﬀerent countries.
3from making productive investments (that would beneﬁt them and society), a low and inequitable
growth process can result (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton,
1997). Besides, in a Keynesian economy where the marginal rate of savings increases with income, or
with a higher propensity to save from capital returns than labour returns, those at the top end of the
distribution may represent the main source of savings (Voitchovsky, 2005). However, in situations
where ability is rewarded, there is incentive for more eﬀort, risk taking and higher productivity,
resulting in higher growth but with higher income inequality. In such cases, talented individuals
will tend to seize higher return to their skills. The resulting concentration of talents and skills in
the advanced technology upper income sector becomes conducive for further innovation and growth
(Hassler and Mora, 2000). Such incentive can induce greater eﬀort in all parts of the distribution
(Voitchovsky, 2005). However, frustration in the lower end of the distribution resulting from per-
ceived unfairness may counteract the innovation gains (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Schwambish et
al. (2003) ﬁnd that top-end inequality strongly and negatively impacts social expenditures, while
the bottom end shows a small positive eﬀect. They suggest that high top-end inequality reduces
social solidarity, with the rich trying to pull out of publicly funded programs such as health care
and education, in preference to private provision.
The political economy channel argues that in the presence of high inequality, distortionary policies
are adopted easily. This adversely aﬀects investment and generates political instability, leading to
stiﬂed growth. Two main views are identiﬁed. One relies on the notion of the median voter, where
wealth inequality increases the gap between the median voter and the average capital endowment
of the economy, leading him to support higher capital tax rates, which in turn reduces incentives to
invest in physical and human capital, hence reducing growth. Persson and Tabelini (1994) suggest
that the rich spend their wealth to lobby for preferential (tax) treatment, leading to more inequality
and slower growth. The other is social conﬂict and political instability. Alesina and Perotti (1993)
argue that higher political instability can result from high inequality, the resulting uncertainty then
reduces investment levels. Rodrik (1996) has noticed that divided societies with weak institutions
also witnessed the sharpest fall in post-1975 growth. This situation weakened their capacity to
respond eﬀectively to external shocks. Also, a recent increase in violence in Latin America and
Sub-Saharan Africa has been matched with high levels of inequality. Another channel makes use of
possible positive externalities in the consumption of certain goods, whose demand may be reduced
by high inequality (Shleifer et al., 1989).
Empirically, various authors have found a negative impact of initial inequality on growth. Pers-
son and Tabelini (1994), using data for nine OECD countries, ﬁnd that a one standard deviation
increase in the income share of the top quintile reduces the growth rate by half a percentage point.
Other veriﬁcations have been made, for a sample of developing countries (Clarke, 1995) and for
a combination of both, in an extended dataset (Deininger and Squire, 1996b). Other works have
nuanced and even contradicted the above. Fishlow (1996) for example, casts doubt on their robust-
ness by controlling for Latin America in the dataset. He ﬁnds an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of inequality
on growth. Forbes (2000) estimates ﬁxed-eﬀect models using decadal country data and ﬁnds a
positive association between inequality and growth. Voitchovsky (2005) controls for the shape of
income distribution5 using the Luxemburg Income Study dataset and ﬁnds that average inequality
cannot eﬃciently capture the eﬀect of inequality on growth. This work disaggregates inequality into
sub-group components and considers possible endogeneity between inequality and output by jointly
estimating production, inequality and poverty.
3M e t h o d o l o g y
The ﬁrst part of this section adapts a Cobb-Douglas per capita production function to accommo-
date inequality; the second adapts a framework for inequality by augmenting Ahluwalia’s (1976a)
5By introducing 90/75 percentile income ratio for the top end and 50/10 ratio for the bottom end.
4formulation with redistributive policy indicators, and the third speciﬁes the pro-poor framework.
3.1 The production framework
Based on a survey of the literature, it is assumed that there are two ways through which inequality
can enter the production function. The ﬁrst is through the credit, savings and investment channel
(Aghion and Bolton, Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 1997; Bourguignon, 2004; Galor and Zeira, 1993)
and the second is through the skills, incentive and innovation channel (Hassler and Mora, 2000;
Voitchovsky, 2005; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Schwabish et al., 2003). These channels suggest that
inequality may exert its eﬀects through individual factor (capital and labour) productivities. The
second is through its eﬀect on the production process at large. The proposed avenue is the political
economy channel6 (Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire, 1996b; Persson
and Tabelini, 1994; Rodrik, 1998). Schleifer et al. (1989) suggest that high inequality may lead to
a reduction in the demand (and the production) of certain goods. These can be suitably captured
by overall and disaggregated (between-group and within-group) inequality measures.
Let Y,K,L and α denote output, capital, labour and parameters respectively and θ1, θ2, θ3
denote average, bottom and top inequalities7 respectively. The basic Cobb-Douglas production
function can be written as follows:




α2 + α3 =1 (4)
The inclusion of inequality in equation (3) follows from the second approach in literature, i.e.
exogenously. The ﬁrst approach, i.e. via factor productivities, will inevitably result in non-linearity
which the limitation of degrees of freedom in the data used in this work can not support. From (4),
the equation (3) can be expressed as follows:




where lower cases are variables expressed in per worker terms (if the population is assumed to
be equal to the work force, then these are in per capita terms). Expressing equation (5) in double
log with t denoting time, gives:
lnyt = α0 + α11 lnθ1t + α12 lnθ2t+α13 lnθ3t + α2 lnkt + εyt (6)
3.2 Inequality framework
The discussion on the Kuznets relationship and the works of Ahluwalia (1976a) and Anand and
Kanbur (1996a and 1996b) suggest that inequality can be a non-linear function of per capita income
(y). The literature also suggests that another important determinant of inequality is an indicator
of redistribution policies that can be proxied by government spending as a ratio of GDP (g). This
work adopts Ahluwalia’s (1976a) formulation because of the ease with which it can be incorporated
in a system of equations such as the one to be used in this work. To the framework, a government







6Based on socio-political unrest, hindering both investment and employment of labour.
7Inequality at the top and bottom end of income distribution curve has been considered by generally taking
percentile ratios. For instance, Voitchovsky (2005) uses 90/75 percentile income ratio for the top end and 50/10 ratio
for the bottom end.
53.3 Poverty framework
The poverty framework is adapted from the Son-Kakwani proposition in equation (2). Since it
expresses poverty, mean income and inequality in ﬁrst-diﬀerence form, (2) can also be expressed at
level. Let Pα(α =0 ,1,2) be any measure of poverty from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family








Log linearising and introducing the error term εpt gives.
lnPα
t = δ0 + δ1 lnyt + δ2 lnθt + εpt (8’)











Simplifying and taking the double log of (9) gives the following functional form:
lnPα
t = δ0 + δ1 lnkt + δ2 lnθt + εpt (9’)
3.4 Estimation Techniques
Because of the possible endogeneity between GDP and inequality, the application of Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) to the single equations of production, inequality and poverty would yield biased results.
These constitute the basis of application of simultaneous equations modeling. In order to estimate
a linear simultaneous equations system, a quadratic term for income in the inequality equation is
exogenised by lagging it by one period. A combined framework of per capita production, inequality




lnyt = α0 + α1 lnθ1t + αlnkt + εyt;
lnθt = y0 + y1 lnyt + y2(lnyt−1)2 + y3 lngt + εθt
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lnyt = α0 + α1 lnθ1t + αlnkt + εyt;
lnθt = y0 + y1 lnyt + y2(lnyt−1)2 + y3 lngt + εθt
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Two possible regression techniques can be applied to systems (10) and (10’). These are two-
stage (2sls) and three-stage (3sls) least squares. 2sls has been thought of as more eﬃcient than
3sls in small samples, particularly when cross-equation covariations are small. In cases of large
covariation, 3sls would have an edge even if the sample is small (Theil, 1971). However, even with
small covariation, Belsley (1988) has shown instances when 3sls is more eﬃcient in small samples.
In this work, cross-equation correlations are estimated. The results give preference to 3sls in all
the cases (Tables 2b). Because of the limited dataset to be used, the variables for inequality at the
top and bottom ends of the income distribution curve are dropped and only total, between-group
and within-group Theil indices8 are considered. In a multiracial society like South Africa, such
decomposition is justiﬁed by the fact that inequality along racial lines may have a strong eﬀect and
in opposition to inequality within racial groups. As such, average inequality might show a neutral
eﬀect. The estimation method adopted is that which corrects for small sample size and reports
student’s t-statistics instead of the normal z-statistics. All the estimations are done using STATA
software.
8The Theil index oﬀers the advantage of sub-group decomposability, where total inequality can be decomposed
into the sum of within-group and between-group components. For more exposition of this property, see Theil (1967)
and Shorrocks (1980).
63.5 Variables and data
Data for this work is limited by the span of poverty and inequality series (from 1993 to 2009).
The following describes the variables and data sources employed in the models: Output per capita
(y): this is captured by GDP divided by the labour force. Capital per worker (k) is the ratio of
gross ﬁxed capital formation to the labour force. Government expenses (g) are measured by total
central government expenses as a ratio of GDP. GDP, capital formation, government expenses (all
in millions of constant 2000 LCU9) and labour force data are from the South African Reserve Bank
(SARB) dataset.
Inequality (θ): Due to its advantage of being additive across subgroups, the Theil—index is
preferred over the Gini coeﬃcient for the measurement of overall income distribution. Sub-group
decomposed inequalities are used in separate frameworks, such that, turn after turn, total, between-
group and within-group10 components are employed. This decomposition is relevant for a multi-racial
society like South Africa where within-group and between-group inequalities are likely to aﬀect (and
respond to) economic growth diﬀerently, such that total inequality would give only average eﬀects.
The poverty variable (Pα) is captured by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT, 1984) family of
poverty indices. Poverty incidence, intensity and severity11 are derived for α =0 ,1 and 2 re-
spectively. These three measures are considered turn by turn, together with the three inequality
measures considered. Inequality and poverty12 data are from the South African Development In-
dicators (2009) published by the Ministry of National Planning at the Presidency of South Africa.
The dataset is based on the bi-annual (All Media and Products Survey — AMPS) data, collected
by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF). This dataset is most suitable for
this analysis for various reasons. First, it gives a more comprehensive time series for the variables
in consideration for this type of work. Second, the dataset has been shown to be more reliable than
the alternative13 (Ardington et al., 2005; Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2004; Simkins, 2004; van der Berg
et al., 2006).
It is important to justify the adequacy of a sample size of seventeen observations. It has been
proven that in cases of high cross-equation covariation, 3sls can perform well in small samples
(Belsley, 1988). However, the exact quantiﬁcation of smallness of a given sample is not found in
literature. Denton and Oksanen (1973) have acceptably used a sample size of ten observations
(1955 to 1964) in a ﬁve-equation simultaneous equation model. Comparatively, this work has four
equations with seventeen observations. Table 1a relates coeﬃcients to their respective variables,
equation and data source, while Table 1b gives the summary statistics.
9Local Currency Unit
10Between-group inequality captures interracial income distribution, within-group inequality captures income dis-
tribution intra-group.
11Foster et al. (1984) suggest a set of poverty measures that are additively decomposable with population-share
weights. For an increasing ordered vector of household incomes(y1,y 2,...,yn), a strictly positive poverty line z, ith
household’s income shortfall gi = z − yi, number of poor households q = q(y;z) and total number of households







can be considered as a measure of poverty aversion, with larger values laying greater emphasis on the poorest of the
poor. P0 is poverty headcount (or incidence); P1 is poverty gap and P2 is poverty severity.
12The poverty data is generated using a poverty line of ZAR 388 per month at constant 2008 ZAR.
13T h ea l t e r n a t i v ei st h eI n c o m ea n dE x p e n d i t u r eS u r v e y sc a r r i e do u tb yS t a t i s t i c sS o u t hA f r i c a . S o m eo fi t s
deﬁciencies relative to the AMPS dataset include high number of ‘zero’ income households and missing income data.
Statistics South Africa also admits that the IES1995 and IES2000 are not directly comparable (van der Berg et al.,
2006). There is also evidence of underrepresentation of white and overrepresentation of black populations in IES2000
(Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2004).
74 Empirical Results
The pair-wise correlation coeﬃcients and probabilities of signiﬁcance for inequality, per capita income
and poverty are presented in Tables 2a. Table 2b contains cross-equations covariates of the models.
Total inequality and within-group inequality are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with per
capita income. By contrast, between-group inequality shows negative association with per capita
income. Income, within-group and total inequality seem to associate negatively with all three mea-
sures of poverty. Because government expenses have a positive and signiﬁcant relationship with GDP,
within-group and total inequality, (which all relate natively to all poverty measures) and a signiﬁcant
negative relationship with inequality between groups (which has signiﬁcant positive association with
all poverty measures), it shows a negative relationship with all three poverty measures.
The cross-equation correlation coeﬃcients in Table 2b are all signiﬁcant at the 1% level, implying
a strong cross-equation covariation. For this reason, 3sls is preferred over 2sls.
Capital per unit labour is signiﬁcant across all the sub-models. While the positive eﬀect of
total inequality on per capita income is not signiﬁcant, between-group inequality has a negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Within-group inequality signiﬁcantly enhances output per worker. The
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of between-group inequality on production may be explained in theory
by credit constrains, political economy (i.e. distortionary policies and socio-political instability)
channels, but also criminality and between-race tensions. Therefore, the interracial tensions and
inequality in access to capital (mostly inherited from the apartheid era) still generate signiﬁcant
adverse eﬀects that stiﬂe economic growth. However, within-group inequality is shown to impact
production positively. This does not mean that inequality should be actively promoted within
groups, but simply that it should not be a major policy concern at present. The positive eﬀect
could be capturing the trickle-down eﬀect of the fruits of growth via social capital within group,
especially in African households where signiﬁcant remittances may go to poorer individuals from the
r i c h e ra n dw e l l - e n d o w e do n e s ,w h i c hc o u l ds e r v ea s capital for productive ventures by the hitherto
poorer members of the group. However, with active black economic empowerment, the increase in
within-group inequality may not mean that the poor are getting poorer within the group,14 but
rather that the eﬀect of income at the top tail of within-group inequality is weighing positively in
the national GDP. The ﬁndings on the eﬀect of inequality corroborate Schwambish et al. (2003) and
Voitchovsky (2005), i.e. that average inequality is not eﬃcient in capturing the inequality-growth
relationship.
Per capita output has a signiﬁcant negative relationship with total and within-group inequality.
The coeﬃcient of its square has a positive sign on these respective measures of inequality. The
signs are reversed in the between-group inequality equation. These suggest that there is an inverted
U-shape inequality-per capita income relationship for between-group inequality, but a U-shaped one
for total and within-group inequality. A Wald (signiﬁcance) test of per capita income and its square
indicates that they are jointly signiﬁcant in all the inequality equations. Given the short span of
the data in question (1993 to 2009), it may be diﬃcult for one to claim that this result supports the
Kuznets U-shaped development-inequality hypothesis. Ahluwalia (1976a: 335) calculates that for an
economy growing at a per capita (GNP) rate of 2.5 percent, it will take about 100 years to transit
from a worsening-inequality phase to a phase where inequality falls. However, the magnitude of
the curvature suggests that the U-shape is a broader one (lower magnitude) than that of Ahluwalia
(1976a) for panel data. It is a little more pronounced when inequality is disaggregated into sub-
groups. The graphs in Figure 1, plotting the relationship between per capita income and total,
between-group and within-group inequalities, may seem to indicate that South Africa is at the
declining phase of the inverted-U for between-group inequality, but at the inclining phase of the U
for within-group inequality.
However, these results agree more with the active post-apartheid policies of Black Economic
Empowerment, which, while yielding fruits in the reduction of between-group inequality, actually
14Blacks constitute 80 percent of the population.
8increases within-group inequality. This is supported by the coeﬃcients of Government expenses with
signiﬁcant negative and positive impacts on between-group and within-group inequality components
respectively. None of the lag values of inequality was signiﬁcant, so is has been excluded from the
equations.
The coeﬃcient of per capita income on poverty incidence is negative and signiﬁcant (at 10% level).
One percent increase in per capita income reduces poverty incidence by 0.232 percent. Regression
with income substituted by production function shows that capital per worker also has anti-poverty
eﬀects (signiﬁcant at 10% level). However, this eﬀect disappears between-group and turns positive
within-group. Between-group inequality (in line with theory that inequality exacerbates poverty) has
poverty increasing eﬀect. A percentage increase in between-group inequality is associated with 0.60
percent higher poverty incidence. But the same increase in within-group leads to 0.542 percent fall
in poverty incidence. Table 4 indicates similar impacts on poverty intensity and severity. Output
per worker and capital both lost their signiﬁcance on poverty (intensity and severity) reduction
in total and between-group inequality sub-models. However, capital’s poverty enhancing eﬀect
remains signiﬁcant within-group. This may be highlighting the fact that very poor individuals
are less endowed in productive capital than the just poor. One percent increase in between-group
inequality leads to 0.853 and 1.093 rise in poverty intensity and severity respectively, suggesting that
the abjectly poor suﬀer more from inequality than others. This eﬀect is reversed within-group, the
same increase is associated with 0.632 and 0.916 percent fall in the respective poverty measures.
The fact that within-group inequality has positive eﬀect on output and negative eﬀect on poverty
(with strongest eﬀect on poverty severity), can only make sense in terms of within-group solidarity,
where growth at ﬁrst widens inequality within-group when the relatively well-endowed individuals
access some of the fruits of economic growth. The well-endowed individuals then remit some of the
growth returns to their poorer family members. These remittances may then serve as productive
capital thereafter. This intuition is supported by the fact that regression with the ﬁrst lag of capital is
poverty reducing in within-group inequality (Tables 3 and 4). The fact that within-group inequality
has strongest eﬀect on poverty severity implies that this redistribution eﬀort within-group happens
for altruistic motives, with the very poor receiving more attention. Statistics South Africa (2002)
reports that the most important source of income for the South African unemployed is ﬁnancial
support from other working members of their household.
By deduction (from the fact that government expenses reduce total and between-group inequal-
ities) and in line with the correlation coeﬃcients of government expenses (negative and signiﬁcant)
on all poverty measures, one would conclude that government eﬀorts are yielding some anti-poverty
fruits. However, as the coeﬃcients indicate, these eﬀorts are a little biased towards the just poor
than the very poor.
5 Conclusion and Policy implications
This study aimed at investigating the link between per capita income, inequality and poverty in South
Africa. For this purpose, a per capita aggregate production function is adapted following theory, with
inequality. Based on literature, an appropriate framework for inequality is also developed. These are
then combined with poverty frameworks, and estimated jointly by means of 3sls Regression technique.
Data for this work is taken mainly from SARB and South African Development Indicators (2009).
The results of the study suggest that between-group inequality reduces output per worker while
within-group inequality enhances it. Between-group eﬀect may be explained in terms of credit
constrain, political economy channel (i.e. distortionary policies and socio-political instability), and
criminality and between race tensions which concur to generate signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects that stiﬂe
economic growth. That of within-group inequality could be capturing the trickle-down eﬀect of the
fruits of growth via social capital within-group especially in African households where signiﬁcant
remittances may go to poorer individuals from the richer and well endowed ones, which could serve
9as capital for productive ventures by the hitherto poorer members of the group. However, with
active black economic empowerment, increase in within-group inequality may not mean that the
poor within-group are getting poorer, but rather that the eﬀect of income at the top tail of within-
group inequality is weighing positively in the national average income. The ﬁndings corroborate
Schwambish et al (2003) and Voitchovsky (2005) i.e. that average inequality is not eﬃcient in
capturing inequality-growth relationship.
There is evidence of inverted U-shape relationship for per capita income with between-group,
but a U-shaped one with total and within-group inequality. Given the short span of the data
in question, this result may not signify a Kuznets U-shaped development-inequality hypothesis.
This rather agrees with the active post-apartheid policies of black economic empowerment, which,
while yielding fruits in the reduction of between-group inequality, actually increases within-group
inequality.
Per capita income has poverty-reducing eﬀects. Substituting income by its function shows that
capital per worker weakly reduces poverty incidence, but weakly enhances poverty intensity and
severity. This is possibly due to weak or no access to productive capital by the abjectly poor.
Widening between-group inequality has poverty-increasing eﬀects, with the abjectly poor suﬀering
more than the rest. Within-group inequality has a reversed eﬀect, with the strongest eﬀect on
poverty severity, which can make sense in terms of within-group solidarity, where growth at ﬁrst
widens inequality within group when the relatively well-endowed individuals access some of the fruits
of economic growth. The well-endowed individuals then remit some of the growth returns to their
poorer family members. The fact that within-group inequality has the strongest eﬀect on poverty
severity implies that this happens for altruistic motives, with the very poor receiving more attention.
This intuition is supported by the fact that the ﬁrst lag of capital is poverty reducing in within-group
inequality. It has been shown that the most important source of income for the unemployed in South
Africa is ﬁnancial support from other working members of their household (STATSA, 2002).
It can be recommended from this ﬁnding that redistribution eﬀorts should focus on the ‘bad’
type of inequality — between group. The eﬀect of government expenses shows that public eﬀort is
doing a great deal to reduce between-group inequality and must be encouraged. More access to
capital by the relatively poorer groups of South Africa may widen within-group inequality, but, in
the long run, will translate into poverty reduction through social capital.
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13Table 1a: Coefficients and Data Source 
Coefficient  Variable  Equation  Data Source 
α0  Constant  Per capita income   
α1  Inequality  Per capita income  SA presidency 
α2  Capital per worker  Per capita income  SA Reserve Bank 
γ0  Constant  Inequality equation   
γ1  Per capita income  Inequality equation  SA Reserve Bank 
γ2  Square of per capita income  Inequality equation  SA Reserve Bank 
γ3  Government expenses per GDP  Inequality equation  SA Reserve Bank 
δ0  constant  Poverty equation   
δ1  Capital per worker  Poverty equation  SA Reserve Bank 




Table 1b: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Total Inequality (Theil)  17  0.94  0.05  0.88  1.03 
Between-group inequality  17  0.49  0.06  0.34  0.55 
Within-group inequality  17  0.45  0.10  0.35  0.61 
Poverty incidence  17  49.06  3.43  41.00  53.00 
Poverty intensity  17  23.79  2.29  19.00  27.00 
Poverty severity  17  14.61  1.78  11.00  17.00 
Gov’t expenses/GDP const. 2000 Rands  17  0.32  0.12  0.15  0.56 
Output per worker const. 2000 Rands  17  76.93  13.00  56.15  91.81 




Table 2a: Pair-Wise Correlation Coefficient for Growth-Inequality Relationship 
Poverty  inequality  Poverty  Output/ worker 
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c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are in brackets 
below each coefficient. T, TB and TW are total, between- and within-group inequality components 
respectively. 
 
14Table 2b: Cross-equation correlation of residuals 

























Table 3: 3sls Regression Results for GDP-Inequality- Output Determinants 
Variable  Total inequality  Between-Group  Within-Group 
Income in Poverty 
Equation 
Capital in Poverty Equation 
Coef  t-stat  Coef  t-stat  Coef  t-stat  Coef  t-stat 
  0.296  0.96  0.305  0.98  -0.081
c  -1.76  0.303
b  2.54 
  0.625
a  10.75  0.623
a  10.64  0.631
a  10.83  0.421
a  4.12 
  2.803
a  17.51  2.807
a  17.41  2.709
a  28.06  3.537
a  10.22 
  -5.942
b  -2.26  -5.368
c  -2.00  24.233
a  5.45  -20.966
a  -5.17 
  0.734
b  2.38  0.670
b  2.14  -2.789
a  -5.38  2.525
a  5.30 
  -0.069  -1.05  -0.081  -1.21  -0.447
a  -4.22  0.196
b  2.74 
  11.799
b  2.10  10.500
c  1.84  -53.812
a  -5.63  42.783
a  4.99 
  -0.232
c  -1.90  -0.166
c  -1.95  0.071  1.46  0.426
a  3.19 
  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.308
a  -3.82 
  -0.240  -0.53  -0.170  -0.37  0.604
a  6.94  -0.417
a  -3.17 
  4.877
a  8.86  4.290
a  18.22  4.156
a  48.70  3.245
a  8.53 
  0.95  162.22  0.95  161.07  0.95  168.32  0.95  139.38 
  0.60  11.46  0.60  11.21  0.84  37.77  0.96  126.03 
  0.39  6.22  0.45  6.68  0.76  38.52  0.74  18.84 
Breusch-
Pagan  4.45  0.217  3.30  0.348  11.77  0.008  9.76  0.021 
Joint test on 




c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The Breusch-Pagan 
Statistics is for the test of independence of residuals of the equations.  F-statistics (under coef. 
Columns) and P-VAL (under t-stat columns) for joint Wald test on   are 
presented on the last row. 
 
15Table 4: 3sls Results for Poverty Intensity and Severity 
Variable  Total inequality  Between-Group  Within-Group 

























































































b  0.768  0.820 
  -  -  -  -  -0.317
c  -0.310  -0.731  -0.154  0.172 













a  0.913  2.271
a  -0.198  -2.645 
  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95 
  0.60  0.60  0.85  0.85  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96 




c denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Two models of within-group 
inequality are estimated, one with lag-value of capital and the other with income in place of capital, in 
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